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Some people are multi-billionaires; others die 
because they are too poor to afford food or 
medications. In many countries, people are denied 
rights to free speech, to participate in political life, or 
to pursue a career, because of their gender, religion, 
race or other factors, while their fellow citizens enjoy 
these rights. In many societies, what best predicts 
your future income, or whether you will attend 
college, is your parents’ income. 
To many, these facts seem unjust. Others disagree: 
even if these facts are regrettable, they aren’t issues 
of justice.[1] A successful theory of justice must 
explain why clear injustices are unjust and help us 
resolve current disputes.[2] John Rawls (1921-2002) 
was a Harvard philosopher best known for his A 
Theory of Justice (1971), which attempted to define a 
just society. Nearly every contemporary scholarly 
discussion of justice references A Theory of Justice. 
This essay reviews its main themes.[3] 
1. The ‘Original Position’ and ‘Veil of Ignorance’ 
Reasonable people often disagree about how to live, 
but we need to structure society in a way that 
reasonable members of that society can 
accept.[4] Citizens could try to collectively agree on 
basic rules. We needn’t decide every detail: we might 
only worry about rules concerning major political 
and social institutions, like the legal system and 
economy, which form the ‘basic structure’ of society. 
A collective agreement on the basic structure of 
society is an attractive ideal. But some people are 
more powerful than others: some may be wealthier, 
or part of a social majority. If people can dominate 
negotiations because of qualities that are, as Rawls 
(72-75) puts it, morally arbitrary, that is wrong. 
People don’t earn these advantages: they get them by 
luck. For anyone to use these unearned advantages to 
their own benefit is unfair, and the source of many 
injustices. 
This inspires Rawls’ central claim that we should 
conceive of justice ‘as fairness.’ To identify fairness, 
Rawls (120) develops two important concepts: 
the original position and the veil of ignorance: 
The original position is a hypothetical situation: 
Rawls asks what social rules and institutions people 
would agree to, not in an actual discussion, but 
under fair conditions,[5] where nobody knows 
whether they are advantaged by luck. Fairness is 
achieved through the veil of ignorance, an imagined 
device where the people choosing the basic structure 
of society (‘deliberators’) have morally arbitrary 
features hidden from them: since they have no 
knowledge of these features, any decision they make 
can’t be biased in their own favor. 
Deliberators aren’t ignorant about everything 
though. They know they are self-interested, i.e., want 
as much as possible of what Rawls calls primary 
goods (things we want, no matter what our ideal life 
looks like). They are also motivated by a minimal 
‘sense of justice’: they will abide by rules that seem 
fair, if others do too. They also know basic facts about 
science and human nature.[6]  
2. Rawls’s Principles of Justice 
Rawls thinks a just society will conform to rules that 
everyone would agree to in the original position. 
Since they are deliberating behind the veil of 
ignorance, people don’t know their personal 
circumstances, or even their view of the good life. 
This affects the kinds of outcomes they will endorse: 
e.g., it would be irrational for deliberators to agree to 
a society where only Christians have property rights 
since if, when the veil is ‘lifted,’ they turn out not to 
be Christian, that will negatively affect their life 
prospects. Similarly, deliberators presumably won’t 
choose a society with racist, sexist, or other unfairly 
discriminatory practices, since beyond the veil, they 
might end up on the wrong side of these policies.[7] 
This gives rise to Rawls’ first principle of justice: 
all people have equal claims to as much freedom as is 
consistent with everyone else having the same level of 
freedom.[8] 
Rawls further claims that, because their ignorance 
includes an ignorance of probabilities, deliberators 
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would be extremely cautious, and apply what he calls 
a ‘maximin’ principle: they will aim to ensure that 
the worst possible position they could end up in is as 
good as possible in terms of primary goods. 
If we imagine ourselves as deliberators, we might be 
tempted by the idea of total equality in primary 
goods. This ensures, at least, that nobody will be 
better off than you for arbitrary reasons. However, 
some inequality might be useful: the possibility of 
earning more might incentivize people to work 
harder, growing the economy and so increasing the 
total amount of available wealth. 
This isn’t a wholehearted endorsement of capitalism, 
as Rawls’ second principle, which addresses social 
and economic inequalities, makes clear. The second 
principle has two parts: 
First, people in the original position will tolerate 
inequalities only if the jobs that pay more aren’t 
assigned unfairly. This gives us the ideal of fair 
equality of opportunity: inequalities are allowed only 
if they arise through jobs that equally talented people 
have equal opportunity to get. This requires, for 
instance, that young people receive roughly equal 
educational opportunities; otherwise, a talented 
individual might be held back by a lack of basic 
knowledge, either about their own talents, or about 
the world. 
Second, since their reasoning is governed by the 
‘maximin’ principle, deliberators will only tolerate 
inequalities that benefit the worst off:[9] since, as far 
as they know, they might be the worst off, this 
maximizes the quality of their worst possible 
outcome. This is called the difference principle. 
These principles are ordered, which tells us what to 
do if they clash: equal liberty is most important, 
then fair opportunity, and finally the difference 
principle. So, neither freedoms nor opportunity are 
governed by the difference principle.[10] 
3. Conclusion 
We can now see how Rawls’ theory might evaluate 
the issues raised earlier. At least within specific 
societies, each seems to violate his basic principles of 
justice, and so would be condemned as unjust. So, 
even if we ultimately reject Rawls’ approach, it at 
least seems to offer intuitively correct answers in 
several important cases, and for plausible reasons. ‘ 
Notes 
[1] For instance, some think that if someone’s money 
is fairly earned, it is not unjust that she does what she 
wants with it, such as spending it to increase her 
children’s opportunities (e.g., Nozick, 1974; 
Narveson, 2001). Others will say that there are no 
genuine ‘rights’, and a society should permit or 
restrict various activities depending on what will 
promote the ‘common good’: this charge has been 
made with considerable force against utilitarianism, 
though it is not one that all utilitarians accept (see 
Glover (1990), Section 3). 
[2] Rawls’ basic view has been importantly extended 
to several areas which he either did not explicitly 
comment on: e.g., Daniels’ (2007) extension of the 
view to healthcare justice, and Rowlands’ (1997) 
extension to animal rights; or in ways with which he 
would have himself explicitly disagreed: compare 
Beitz’s (1979) ‘Rawlsian’ approach to global justice 
with Rawls’ (1999a) own published views. 
[3] A Theory of Justice is a work of considerable length 
and detail, and this essay omits many elements of 
interest. For instance, this essay does not review 
Rawls’ discussion of his intellectual debt to the work 
of Immanuel Kant, e.g., in his criticism of utilitarian 
theory as failing to respect the ‘separateness of 
persons’ (191), and his reliance on the idea of 
grounding justice in a contract that is understood not 
as an historical event, but as a theoretical constraint 
(see Kant, 1793). 
[4] A Theory of Justice focuses on ‘domestic’ justice, i.e., 
justice within a particular society. Rawls (1999a) 
addresses the distinct question of global or 
international justice. Rawls suggests that justice at 
the global level exists between peoples (groups bound 
by, e.g. a common culture, language, or history) not 
individuals, since there is no common global 
structure equivalent to the ‘basic structure’ of a 
society. While international justice is also developed 
by reference to a veil of ignorance, the deliberators 
are representatives of societies. As such, Rawls 
believes that their concerns would be very different, 
including a strong emphasis on respect for national 
sovereignty, with exceptions only in cases of severe 
human rights violations. In addition, so long as all 
peoples or nations have institutions that enable their 
members to live decent lives, any remaining 
inequality is not morally troubling. As outlined 
below, this is in stark contrast to his theory of 
domestic justice. 
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[5] Rawls’ view is therefore a ‘hypothetical contract’ 
theory (i.e. it rests on what would be agreed under 
certain idealised assumptions), as opposed to the 
‘actual contract’ view (e.g. Gauthier, 1986; Gilbert, 
2006). 
[6] One further condition that deliberators know, 
which Rawls borrows from David Hume (1738: Book 
3, Part 2, Section 2), is that they exist in a condition of 
‘moderate scarcity’, which according to both authors 
is a ‘circumstance’ of justice. The basic idea is that 
justice is only necessary where there are potential 
conflicts (i.e., when we do not have an abundance of 
goods), but if there is not enough even to meet 
everyone’s basic needs (i.e., ‘extreme scarcity’), those 
who lose out cannot be expected to abide by the 
rules. So society – and with it our system of justice – 
will break down. 
[7] In fact, though, Rawls’ is remarkably silent on 
racial injustice, and there has been considerable 
debate about whether his system of thought has the 
space to properly address such issues. See e.g., Mills 
(2009); Shelby (2013). Related critiques have also 
been made with respect to other forms of injustice, 
such as gender-related injustice (e.g. Okin, 1989) and 
injustice against people with disabilities (e.g. Sen 
(1980); Nussbaum (2006)). 
[8] This was later revised to a weaker requirement: 
that people have access to a “fully adequate” set of 
basic rights and liberties (2001: 42-3): these rights 
cannot be overridden by appeals to the common 
good. 
[9] However, the ‘worst off’ here are to be understood 
only in reference to “social and economic 
inequalities” (Rawls, 1999b: 53). Inequalities of 
‘natural’ goods (which includes health) are not 
included because they are not things we can directly 
redistribute between people, unlike social goods such 
as money and opportunity. 
[10] However, there is some apparent inconsistency 
across Rawls’ work here. Later (2001: 266), he seems 
to suggest that some inequalities of opportunity are 
inevitable, and that they must therefore be turned to 
the benefit of those with the least opportunity: this 
view looks remarkably like a difference principle for 
opportunity. 
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